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The Morality of Everyday Activities:
Not the Right, But the Good Thing To Do Daniel Nyberg
ABSTRACT. This article attempts to understand and
develop the morality of everyday activities in organiza-
tions. Aristotle’s concept of phronesis, practical wisdom,
is utilized to describe the morality of the everyday work
activities at two call centres of an Australian insurance
company. The ethnographic data suggests that ethical
judgements at the lower level of the organization are
practical rather than theoretical; emergent rather than
static; ambiguous rather than clear-cut; and particular
rather than universal. Ethical codes are of limited value
here and it is argued that by developing phronesis
members of the organization can improve their capacity
to deal with this ethical complexity.
KEY WORDS: aristotle, ethical codes, organizational
ethics, phronesis, situated ethics
Introduction
Our present inquiry is (unlike our others) not aimed at
theoretical knowledge. We are not conducting our
inquiry in order to know the definition of virtue, but
in order to become good, otherwise it would not
benefit us at all. So we must think about what con-
cerns actions and how we ought to perform
them…(Aristotle cited in Hughes, 2001: 13)
There is a growing focus on business ethics in the
aftermath of recent corporate scandals. The main
response from the business community has been to
develop ethical codes or rules for members of
organizations to follow (Clegg et al., 2006; Cum-
mings, 2002; Stevens, 2004). In the quotation above,
Aristotle points out the limitations of ostensive def-
initions and codes of ethics in increasing morality in
organizations. Aristotle redirects our attention away
from codes of ethics and towards the situated
activities where ethical choices are actually made.
This article aims to further develop an understanding
of the morality of everyday activities by illustrating
the ambiguity of ethics, and to advance the notion of
practical and situated ethics to further enhance eth-
ical activities in organizations. The practical
accomplishment of organizational life is shown to be
ambiguous and it is not clear when ethical reasoning
is being applied (Trevino and Brown, 2004). The
normal problems workers and managers deal with in
doing their jobs are not major ethical dilemmas or
ethical policy-making, but rather routine tasks and
everyday work practices (Alvesson and Svennings-
son, 2003). It is in these mundane everyday activities
that an ethical discussion needs to begin in order to
avoid ethical dilemmas and to develop practical
ethical awareness (Clegg et al., 2006). This calls for a
situated and practical concept of ethics to describe
empirically the morality of work activities, how
activities become im/moral, and how morality can
be increased in everyday organizational practices. In
the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (350 B.C./1999)
discusses an intellectual virtue based on practical
wisdom, phronesis, which is an appropriate candidate
for the pursuit of ethics in practice (MacIntyre,
1981; Tsoukas and Cummings, 1997).
Arguably, traditional ethical theories (consequen-
tialism and deontology) are not suitable for this project,
since universal principles and rules leave little room
for the ambiguity and everydayness of situated work
activities. Traditional ethical theories are primarily
concerned with evaluating ethical reasoning based
on the outcome of their consequences according to
utilitarianism; or, deontological moral rules based on
duty, rights and justice. While coming from diverse
intellectual traditions, what these ethical theories
have in common is that acting ethically is concerned
with following rules based on: (a) the benefit and
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harm of the action (utilitarian); (b) whether the
principle of the action can become a universal law
(duty); (c) whether the action respects human and
natural rights (rights); or (d) whether the procedure
and outcome of the action is fair (justice). This
article does not argue against these theoretical tra-
ditions and it is not opposed to ethical rules and
principles. On the contrary, ongoing theoretical
discussions are beneficial to moral training and
reflection. Rather the problems are (1) the univer-
salistic claim that the codes or principles of ethics
extracted from these theories can be used to evaluate
and promote ethical behaviour in any given situation
and organization (Bauman, 1993); and (2) the belief
that following these theories will lead to the ethically
right act, which means that we can use them to
evade our responsibilities for our own actions. Al-
though we can be guided by ethical theories, we
need to be aware that narrow and precise theoretical
principles of ‘‘right’’ and ‘‘wrong’’ are forced upon
broad organizational practice, which has a com-
plexity that the moral theories cannot capture
(Maguire, 1997). The principles and rules often ap-
pear to be indifferent to the position and situation
from which any business decision is taken, which
makes them idealistic rather than pragmatic (Solo-
mon, 1992). These theories are arguably more
applicable to theoretically defined situations and
problems or quests for universally true or right ac-
tions, than problems we encounter in practice.
It is important to discuss the limitations of ethical
codes, since developing them is the conventional
approach to dealing with business ethics in organi-
zations (Clegg et al., 2006; Cummings, 2002;
Kjonstad and Willmott, 1995; Munro, 1997; Mur-
phy, 1995; Stevens, 2004). It is even plausible to
suggest that ethical rules and codes can have the
opposite effect from what is intended. Developing
ethical codes can be a way for corporations to pay lip
service to the surrounding community. It has been
argued that larger firms have ethical codes, but they
are commonly used for their symbolic value in sat-
isfying stakeholders and improving the corporate
image (Kjonstad and Willmott, 1995; Munro, 1997;
Stevens et al., 2005). This implies that if no one is
‘‘watching’’ the corporations would not implement
the codes, which makes profit (not ethics) the pur-
pose of having codes and so they do not add any-
thing beyond the economic logic of the
organizations (Cummings, 2002). The huge gulf
between having ethical codes and actually following
them is convincingly illustrated by Enron, a com-
pany with an extensive ethical code (Stevens, 2004).
Furthermore, adherence to ethical codes or rules can
limit ethical awareness, since ethical codes can lull
people into the false belief that as long as they follow
the code, they are acting ethically (McCracken et al.,
1998). It is symptomatic of this that most ethical
codes are concerned with protecting the company
from legal action and fines, rather than providing
guidance for acting ethically (Murphy, 1995; Ste-
vens, 1994, 2004; Vogel, 1992). This is not sur-
prising, since ethical codes or rules cannot deal with
the ethical complexity and ambiguity of many situ-
ations. If the situation were straightforward, one
would arguably not require ethical reasoning in the
first place. Finally, there is a paradox in being forced
to comply with ethical codes or rules and claiming to
act ethically. Aristotle (1999) suggests that actions
need to be voluntary to be ethical.
To complement and make better use of ethical
codes in organizations, this article continues by first
drawing upon Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics to
understand the morality of situated activities. It ar-
gues that Aristotle’s concept of phronesis is useful to
highlight both ethical and political considerations of
practitioners and their activities. Second, the case
material, two call centres of a medium-sized Aus-
tralian insurance company, is outlined together with
the research methodology. The empirical illustra-
tions are based on 8 months of mainly observational
fieldwork to describe practical performance as it
happens in context. Third, the findings are analysed
and presented separately for the two call centres,
Business Relations and Support Centre, to situate the
discussion of phronesis empirically. The extracts
from the Business Relations call centre illustrate how
phronesis is learnt through collaborative experience
and questioning the work rules. The observations
from the Support Centre illustrate how different
situated pressures drain individuals from phronesis
and allow ethics to slip. It is finally concluded that
the development of phronesis can empower
employees to undertake morally appropriate activi-
ties. The advantages of a phronesis-based approach
to ethics are outlined through comparison with
more conventional approaches in business ethics.
Through this comparison, the article makes empirical
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and theoretical contributions to understanding the
practical development of morality and ethical reflec-
tions in everyday activities.
Phronesis: practical wisdom
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (1999) outlines
three classes of intellectual virtue: Episteme, Techne
and Phronesis. Episteme (scientific knowledge) can be
likened to the concept of ethics based on rules and
principles of how to act (consequentialism and
deontology). Techne (craft knowledge) is concerned
with the skills and know-how of craft and produc-
tion. This article will discuss the third, Phronesis
(practical wisdom), which is ‘‘concerned with action
about things that are good or bad for a human
being’’ (Aristotle, 1999: 89). The ethical component
makes phronesis the highest intellectual virtue above
and beyond the other two. Phronesis is not the
‘‘right’’ way of doing things in a particular com-
munity, but the ethically good action a practical wise
person would take. Although practical, techne differs
from phronesis in that the means of production are
for the sake of products, while phronesis has it end in
itself, that is, acting with practical wisdom (Aristotle,
1999). To understand a practically wise action, it
would not be enough to look at the end product or
the consequence of what a person did; we need to
see how and why the person did what s/he did in
that particular situation (Bragues, 2006). Ethical
evaluations need to be situated and contextualized.
Phronesis is the ability to act well in specific situa-
tions (Aristotle, 1999). By putting practice in the
foreground, phronesis closely connects ethics and
actions in situated circumstances, ‘‘since [phronesis]
is concerned with action and action is about par-
ticulars’’ (Aristotle, 1999: 92).
Aristotle (1999) questions the usefulness of
knowledge, which is not connected to actions by
arguing that you only become good by doing good.
The emptiness of knowledge and the impossibility of
becoming good without actions are illustrated by the
example of a patient not following a doctor’s advice:
The many, however, do not do these [virtuous]
actions. They take refuge in arguments, thinking that
they are doing philosophy, and that this is the way to
become excellent people. They are like a sick person
who listens attentively to the doctor, but acts on none
of his (sic) instructions. Such a course of treatment will
not improve the state of the sick person’s body; nor
will the many improve the state of their souls by this
attitude to philosophy. (Aristotle, 1999: 22)
For Aristotle, the virtue of a person is in their cus-
tomary actions: ‘‘Virtue of character results from
habit [ethos]; hence its name ‘ethical’, slightly varied
from ‘ethos’’’ (Aristotle, 1999: 18). Virtue is intrinsic
to the human being and comes naturally without
application of ethical rules. The habitual act does not
make it thoughtless, since a virtuous person takes the
right action in each particular circumstance knowing
that it is the right action. The reason and desire of
the action is in it, not causing it. The good action
cannot be described independently of the situation
in which it is performed, or generalized into uni-
versal laws or rules, since that would separate
knowledge from actions and the rule from the
contextual circumstances. Again using a doctor and
the practice of medicine to make the point, Aristotle
argues for the particular situation in which the vir-
tuous action occurs:
For what the doctor appears to consider is not even
health [universally, let alone good universally], but
human health, and presumably the health of this hu-
man being even more, since he (sic) treats one par-
ticular patient at a time. (Aristotle, 1999: 7)
A good doctor knows how to treat each particular
patient based on general knowledge of medicine,
but, more importantly, on practical experience of
actually treating patients (Morse, 1999). Conse-
quently, ethics must focus on activities in a particular
situation, since no patient or situation is the same.
Aristotle does not believe that there can be generally
applicable ethical rules and he offers no decisional
procedure, since the circumstances always change.
Furthermore, if we are forced to obey rules, the
actions are not virtuous, because a precondition for
virtue is that the action is voluntary (Aristotle, 1999).
Consequently, with an increase in external pressures
we have a simultaneous decrease in possible virtuous
actions. These actions can still have a good cause or
consequence, but they would not be virtuous.
Ethical considerations cannot be pinned down to
certain principles, since we ought to behave differently
in different situations. In practice, ethical decision-
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making always takes place in particular circumstances
(Morse, 1999). The goodness of the action is in it,
without any separation of the act and the delibera-
tion leading up to it. Aristotle’s concept of phronesis
can therefore be seen as bridging the mind/body
dualism, since the habit of virtue is the habit of
thought and action. Phronesis is about doing ‘‘the
right thing, in the right way, and at the right time’’
(Aristotle, 1999: 94). It is concerned with making
good judgements in ambiguous everyday situations.
We need to situate ethics empirically in our every-
day practical coping whenever ethical decisions and
choices appear. Arguing against universalism, but for
holism, Aristotle recognized that virtuous activities
are necessarily embedded in a community, polis, and
that the evaluation is not based on a single act, but
on the agent’s virtue. In evaluating agent’s behav-
iour, the totality of both the individual and the
practical situation must be considered. We move
from the universal question of ‘‘what N should do
relative to a certain consideration’’ to the situated
question of ‘‘what N should do all things consid-
ered’’. Only the second question is likely to occur in
practice and the good action, according to Aristotle
(1999), would be the action that a practically wise
agent, phronimos, would take in that situation.
There is an interesting tension in Aristotle’s ethics
between the virtue of actions and the kind of com-
munity an individual takes these actions in, since
phronesis is learned first and foremost from the polis.
It is the polis that situates phronesis socially and
shapes it politically. It is in the performance of
activities in a specific community that morality is
displayed and can be ethically scrutinized. An Aris-
totelian approach to ethics thus naturally incorporates
politics (Nielsen, 1998), which is suitable for the
social and political corporate existence. This also
makes the concept of phronesis useful for analysing
and developing situated work activities from an
ethical perspective. The polis, in our case a medium-
sized insurance company, nurtures individual actions
with its practices. Phronesis cannot be separated from
the position and situation in which the activities are
embedded. From an Aristotelian approach, all our
thinking and acting is dependent on the idea that we
are part of established and ongoing practices, not a
separate atomistic individual (Solomon, 2004). In the
practical wise act and deliberation, the individual and
society are connected. The organizational member is
embedded and acts in a particular polis, which both
limits and extends the individual’s ethical capacity.
Research settings and methods
This article is based on a qualitative empirical study
undertaken in a single organization in order to explore
moral actions and ethical reflections in their contexts
(Kjonstad and Willmott, 1995). An in-depth case
study is suitable if you are interested in practical and
context-dependent knowledge to advance our
understanding of situated and practical ethics
(Flyvbjerg, 2001; Maguire, 1997). The organization,
ACNE (a pseudonym), was a medium-sized insurance
company with 23 branches and 1,700 employees in
Australia. Its main product was car insurance, fol-
lowed by other types of insurance (house, business,
farm, boat, motorbike and caravan) and services
(financial services, roadside assistance and home
security). The empirical data discussed in this article
was collected at two different call centres operated by
ACNE, Business Relations and Support Centre, which
both handled service calls using mainly script-based
performance. Call centres have a reputation in the
business community of using enhanced Tayloristic
techniques to control their employees. The consul-
tants in the two centres were strictly guided by their
computer screens in providing service to customers.
There are interesting social and technological
dimensions to the morality of performing customer
service in a tightly controlled and ruled-based envi-
ronment.
Although similar in terms of technology and
control, the two departments had distinct tasks.
Business Relations handled questions, feedback and
complaints from internal and external customers.
Internal calls involved helping other departments in
ACNE by amending specific details of an insurance
policy, for example, when a customer moved to
another state, had been charged too much or was
granted discounts. External calls were about resolving
a variety of problems for unsatisfied customers, for
example, complaints about the service received,
disputes about the claim process, or the amount of
money awarded. Business Relations had one man-
ager who supervised two team leaders, each of whom
had a team of eight employees. The manager and the
team leaders had supervisory positions and did not
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take calls. Support Centre took service calls from
customers who had problems and required roadside
assistance or assistance in their home. For example, if
the customer’s car broke down, the operators in the
Support Centre made sure that someone assisted the
customer to change their car battery, tow the car, or
to repair it at the breakdown location. The consul-
tants also arranged other customer care services,
depending on the insurance product the customer
had, such as getting them a taxi, a rental car, or
accommodation where the car broke down. There
were two team leaders for each team of 27 employ-
ees. The team members could approach either with
enquiries during the day. The two-team leaders, who
had a supervisory and coaching role, reported to the
Support Centre manager.
The main method of data collection was observa-
tions to describe, document and understand the
activities in their natural spatial and temporal envi-
ronment (Alexander, 2005; Esterberg, 2002; Silver-
man, 2001; Yin, 2003). The extended observations
were conducted weekly in and around the two
departments for 8 months. I took an indirect role in
the organization by participating in lunches, tea
breaks, informal discussions, and meetings but I did
not have any sort of work role at ACNE. Most of the
observations took the form of following one front-
line consultant through their day at work. I had my
own headset, which meant that I could listen to the
calls. I took extensive notes during my observations.
The ‘‘shadowing’’ were complemented with inter-
views and textual examinations. Unstructured infor-
mal interviews were conducted in the field to explore
information about data already observed (Fontana and
Frey, 2003). The members of the organization were
encouraged to talk to me during the observations, but
I rarely asked specific questions and I tried to have
neutral responses to the information they provided.
The unstructured in-field questions were aimed at
understanding how and why the consultant acted in a
particular situation. Examples of these open-ended
questions were: ‘‘What are you doing now?’’ and
‘‘Why are you doing that?’’
My initial observations were descriptive and
made from a bottom–up approach (Angrosino and
Mays de Pe´rez, 2003; LeCompte and Schensul,
1999). I took little for granted in an attempt to map
out what was done repeatedly in the organization,
which it involved, in what place, using what
equipment. During the longitudinal field study it
was then possible to connect actors, activities,
equipment and settings into practices, consisting of
frequent and similar activities by certain actors
using specific tools in particular settings (Lofland
and Lofland, 1995). The practice around which this
article is built was the most frequent and exten-
sively performed practice of giving service to cus-
tomers in each department. The consultants in the
two departments spent approximately 70% of their
time (including breaks) on customer service. After
mapping out the main practice of taking customer
service calls, my more focused observations studied
how customer service was done in each department.
For example, how the members routinely acted
when facing a problem in communication with a
customer. It was then possible to compare how
practice varied internally (within the call centre);
externally (between different departments); and
from described or prescribed practices (by man-
agement, according to training manuals or job
descriptions). The analytical focusing and re-
focusing consequently emerged in three inter-
twined sequences: (1) mapping what was done in
the different communities, that is, the social and
repeated practices; (2) mapping how it was normally
done in an attempt to find out how and when it
was done differently and (3) analyzing the cir-
cumstances of deviant cases to understand the
morality of these performances to facilitate an ethical
discussion.
The findings for the two call centres are presented
and discussed separately in order to situate the
discussion in the context of the empirical data.
Accepted everyday activities and practices in the call
centres were often so embedded and pervasive that it
was difficult to theorize about them. During the
observations, it became clear that in the day-to-day
organizational activities, there were rarely any clear-
cut ethical dilemmas and everyday practice is best
described as morally ambiguous. However, it is by
attending to everyday activities that major ethical
dilemmas can be avoided by ‘‘nipping them in the
bud’’ and not allowing morally ambiguous activities
to develop into ethical scandals. The numbered
extracts from the field notes describe everyday life
on the shop floor of the organization. All names are
pseudonyms to protect the organization, call centres,
consultants and team leaders.
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Business relations: phronesis and decisions
that bite
The cubicles in Business Relations were shoulder
high when sitting down, which meant that people
could see each other’s faces. There were constant
interactions between the consultants and a buzz of
communication, even though the computer screen
in front of each individual consultant by and large
determined the outcome of the calls. Interactions
and collaborations were not only from their desks.
Members of the two Business Relations teams
walked around and talked to each other about dif-
ferent issues and problems. The consultants often sat
down at each other’s desks to discuss how to solve
problems. To initiate these kinds of interactions, the
person simply shouted the other person’s name. This
supports Tsoukas and Vladimirou’s (2001) observa-
tions in a similar workplace environment in Greece,
where consultants frequently consulted one another
to perform customer service. It was through col-
laboration that the employees learned how to per-
form customer service. The consultants rarely asked
team leaders for advice and they developed a sense
that they were in charge and able to take decisions.
This sense of empowerment was supported by the
centre manager and the team leaders, who told the
consultants to question the rules of the script-based
work. The following extract illustrates how the
consultants interacted to take an everyday decision
to break the rule provided by the computer screen.
The rule imposed by the computer program assumes
that the driver and the insured person are the same.
Extract 1: Driving Miss Daisy
An 85 year-old lady has a car, but no driving license.
Her husband, who died 10 years ago, used to drive the
car. The kids now drive her around in her car. Lauren
asks Amy about how to insure the customer’s car.
After a short discussion with Amy, Lauren goes around
the ‘‘system’’ by putting the lady as a qualified driver,
even though she is not. This is based on the assump-
tion that the old lady will not drive anyway. In the case
notes Lauren writes: ‘‘confirmed with Amy’’.
Lauren: ‘‘Our business is not cut and dry, so it is always
good to have someone else’s opinion. The answer to this
query could have been ‘no’.’’
Lauren continues: ‘‘We all know a bit about each other’s
customers. The decisions can come back and bite us’’.
(Business Relations, 2005-05-11)
Lauren, in the extract above, took an ethical
decision to help the elderly lady by insuring her
car, even though the computer did not allow this.
In collaboration with Amy, Lauren improvised and
willingly circumvented not only the programmed
computer screen but also the rules on how to
insure customers. The old lady is now insured no
matter who drives her car. Lauren’s decision was
not the ‘‘right’’ decision, according to the stan-
dardized rules of ACNE, but arguably the morally
‘‘good’’ decision in helping the customer. In their
discussion, the consultants only expressed concern
about the lady’s well-being and did not consider
sales figures or ‘‘getting rid’’ of a problem. This
decision could not become a moral rule, since on
the next occasion it may be a driver with other
reasons for not being able to drive the car. It
would be less ethical, for example, to support a
person who had lost her/his licence for serial
drunk driving offences and insure him/her as a
‘‘qualified driver’’, although, there may be cir-
cumstances where this actually would be the
morally good thing to do. It soon became clear
that rules cannot cover all areas and that the good
action cannot be planned beforehand. It was in
breaking the rule that Lauren made a practical
ethical judgement in the extract above. This was
done in collaboration with another team member
to ensure that the decision did not come back and
‘‘bite’’ her. It was by sharing stories of different
situations and decisions that the consultants
developed their capacity to deal with different
situations (Orr, 1996). By connecting past exam-
ples to current situations, the consultants could
then reflect upon the situations and develop
phronesis (Cummings, 2002).
Phronesis required greater moral sensitivity than
the rule-based ethical theories (Dunne, 1993), since
it was important for the consultants to be alert to
each particular case. The consultants needed to be
alert to when the script-based rules on the computer
screen were applicable and when they should be
questioned and discussed. The script-based rules could
still be productive and there was no evident opposi-
tion between the ‘‘technical’’ rationality of computers
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and the moral judgements of practical wise consultants
(Smith, 1999). The computer-based rules and pro-
cedures gave the consultants reflective space for
phronesis to question and challenge the rules. This
could lead to more appropriate rules upon which the
consultants could take even better decisions by freeing
time for practical deliberation in other situations.
Phronesis is about knowing when the general rules are
to be followed, but phronimos will also know when
and why to deviate from those rules.
Scope for questioning the rules also gives people
scope to not follow the accepted practices when they
should have done, which means that reflective space
in performance is also space for practical slippage.
Lauren mentioned, in the extract above, that deci-
sions could come back and ‘‘bite’’ the consultants.
The following extract illustrates a situation where
Lauren got bitten:
Extract 2: Files that bite
Irene is handling a file previously worked on by
Lauren, in which Lauren wrote off a policy. Irene
looks at the file and then turns around to Lauren in the
cubicle behind her and asks her: ‘‘Can you please come
over for a second?’’ Lauren walks over to Irene’s desk and
immediately recognizes the policy on Irene’s computer
screen. In discussing the file with Irene, Lauren says: ‘‘I
did a dodgy job. I should have investigated it. Instead I just
wrote it off.’’ They agree upon the right action together
and the incident is not reported to team leaders or the
manager. (Business Relations, 2005-10-14)
In the extract above, Lauren had made an error in
a file and it was subsequently picked up by Irene.
Lauren did not remember why she did a ‘‘dodgy’’
job, but recognized the work she did as dodgy and
that it was not the proper thing to do. Her
judgement had slipped in practice and this had
monetary consequences for the customer. How-
ever, the tight collaboration in Business Relations
worked as a ‘‘safety net’’ for the consultants, as
they relied on other team members to cover their
backs if they uncovered an error at a later date.
This safety net was not only used to protect the
customers but also fellow team members. The
consultants could allow their services to ‘‘slip’’
without any consequences, as long as there was a
high level of cooperation among colleagues. This
cooperation made sure that some of the slippage
was corrected, but also that the slippage was not
reported to team leaders or managers. The slippage
in this case was picked up by a team member,
discussed between colleagues and corrected. Like
the discussion regarding the old lady in extract 1,
the new judgement in extract 2 was made through
practical collaboration; they took the alternative
action together. They experienced a particular
situation in practice, which may prevent these two
consultants performing a ‘‘dodgy’’ job or making
an unethical decision in similar situations at a later
date. This illustrates how phronesis is learned
through doing. It was through experience, col-
laboration and discussion that the consultants
learned to take morally appropriate practical deci-
sions. Without ethical rules to follow, the con-
sultants were left to gain phronesis by muddling
their way through various problems and situations
(Maguire, 1997).
Support centre: following rules and timing
ethics
There was not as much collaboration in the Support
Centre as in Business Relations. Most of the con-
sultants asked team leaders rather than team members
for advice when facing a problem. Interactions be-
tween team members occurred but not with the
frequency found in Business Relations. The cubicles
were higher and the consultants mostly had their
backs to each other as they worked. The consultants
in the Support Centre rarely left their desks and they
did not question the scripts and the ordering of calls
presented to them by the computer system. The
extract below from the Support Centre illustrates the
response from the consultants in the Support Centre
to a specific service request when a customer had
locked his keys in his car.
Extract 3: Children or animals?
Andrea is on the phone to a customer who has locked
his keys in the car. To this Andrea promptly asks: ‘‘Do
you have any children or animals in the car?’’ The customer
does not, and Andrea proceeds with the call, checking
his details and location. She tells him that it will take
about 60 min before a service car will be able to help
him. According to Andrea, Chloe and Victoria, all the
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operators ask if there are any children or animals in the
car when responding to a customer who has locked
their keys in the car. If there are, the nearest patrol
immediately interrupts their current work and goes
straight to the car to get the children or animals out. If
a patrol car unexpectedly discovers children or animals
in a car, the operators get verbally reprimanded for
neglecting to clarify the issue with the customer.
(Support Centre, 2005-08-15)
The Support Centre displayed a duty of care (Gilligan,
1982) towards its customers by making sure that
children or animals are taken care of first, even though
this would mean letting more profitable services or
customers wait or not be attended to. A more cynical
reading would be that ACNE does it to avoid law-
suits. However, when openly asked about the prac-
tice, the consultants only expressed concern about
possible harm to children and animals. Asking whe-
ther there are children or animals in the car was simply
a customary practice at the Support Centre, because
nowhere in the detailed descriptions of how to handle
customers with car problems was it lay down that the
operators should ask this question. None of the many
prescriptive texts, for example, the computer screen,
the call coaching form, training manuals and job
description, suggested that the question should be
asked. This illustrates that the morality of the practice
was in the habitual acts, not in documented codes or
principles.
The rule on asking this question in the Support
Centre only existed because it had become estab-
lished practice among the consultants. It was upheld
by the consultants and the drivers of the patrol cars.
It is conceivable that there could be situations where
this question might ‘‘slip’’ and not be asked due to
various organizational pressures, as the practice of
asking the question did not exist in a political vac-
uum. In the Support Centre, in contrast with the
other departments at ACNE, operators were
expected to have an average handling time of less
than 2 min per call. The next extract illustrates how
this affected the everyday interactions between the
consultants and the customers.
Extract 4: Interrupting customers
Phillip tries to finish the call, but the distressed
sounding customer wants further assurance that the
service car will find him. Phillip glances at the ticking
clock on the screen just turning red from green telling
him that the call has lasted more than 2 min. After
finally finishing the call, Phillip checks his ‘‘Average
handling time’’ (the average time in seconds that the
consultants have been talking to customers for each
call) and ‘‘Availability’’ (the percentage of their time
that is spent taking or waiting for calls) for the day: ‘‘If
the customer waffles on, you have to interrupt. This is because
of your stats’’. (Support Centre, 2005-06-16)
The importance of the statistics for the consultants in
the Support Centre was constantly confirmed by my
observations. The statistics also caused a lot of dis-
tress for the consultants. Consequently, the habit of
asking whether there are children or animals in the
car could easily be allowed to slip, due to the time
limits and the pressure to process the calls they
receive as quickly as possible. This efficiency pres-
sure had not always been part of the working prac-
tices at the Support Centre and a long-standing
member of staff connected it to the introduction of
information and communication technology.
Extract 5: The culture of the Support Centre
Catherine: ‘‘The culture used to be more about service than
efficiency, but now it is more about efficiency than service.
They (managers) used to not care about how long you spent
talking to a customer as long as the customer was satisfied’’.
(Support Centre, 2005-09-29)
As a result of compressing the interaction with the
customer, the question could ‘‘slip’’ out of practice
and not be asked.
Another reason for slippage at ACNE was man-
agement circulation. Team leaders from other parts
of ACNE coached calls in the Support Centre even
though they had never themselves been exposed to
or put into practice the rule of asking whether there
are children or animals in the car. The following
extracts illustrate concerns by both team leaders
and consultants in the Support Centre about this
practice.
Extract 6: The crucified team leader
Tricia, a team leader, says that ACNE wants all the
different team leaders to be able to coach and lead all
the different areas. This means that team leaders from
other departments within ACNE should be able to
coach in the Support Centre. Tricia: ‘‘Rose (team leader
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from another department) came down here and was crucified.
In theory, we should be able to coach in all the different areas,
but it just doesn’t work that way’’. Andrea responds:
‘‘This is all part of that ‘multi-skilling’’’, she says with an
ironic emphasis on multi-skilling. (Support Centre,
2005-08-09)
The problem with swapping team leaders between
departments was also expressed by other consultants.
Tom: ‘‘When we approached her (team leader from another
department) with a problem, she said that she didn’t know
our procedures and could not help, so we had to ask Tricia
(another team leader)’’. (Support Centre, 2005-09-29)
It was the team leaders that coached the consultants to
improve their practice in answering calls. ‘‘Call
coaching’’ and socialization into the work by team
leaders who had never done this job themselves could
provide room for ethical slippage. The standardized
call coaching forms did not cover all areas. The forms
were designed to evaluate the efficiency of the con-
sultant in terms of greeting the customer in the correct
way, reporting the right details, and providing the right
answer. The good responses, for example, asking
whether there are children or animals in the car, were
not included. Not until an accident happens, or the
practices are reflected upon by external stakeholders,
might the virtue of the practices be considered.
However, by then, ethical considerations are often
too late. By then, a child or an animal may have been
suffocated locked in a car on a hot Australian summer’s
day. Although disciplinary practices can be both
productive and ethical, this manipulation could be
replaced by increased awareness of the good thing to
do in caring about others. By giving workers time to
reflect on their activities and practices, the question of
whether or not there are children or animals in the car
would probably be asked, not because it is the uni-
versal right thing to do, but rather because we can put
ourselves in that position, comprehend the despair,
and understand that it is the best alternative of the
possible actions. This alternative could, of course,
resemble the outcomes of ethical theoretical evalua-
tions of the situation, but what is important is to
develop practical wisdom to solve problems in the
organization, not to develop universal principles that
may or may not be applicable in subsequent situations.
Situating ethics in a context highlights the con-
trolling and disciplinary constraints to understanding
the situation in which the behaviour occurs as well
as how widespread this behaviour is in that particular
community. It was evident that the routine practices
in each of the call centres were being performed and
adjusted to the stresses and strains of the community.
Increasing the pressure on the Support Centre staff
to end the calls within 2 min, therefore, could lead
to the disappearance of the habits of morality, which
would then have to be replaced by social or tech-
nological control if they were not to be lost. Most
instances of ethical slippage could easily be solved
socially through more extensive call-coaching, or
technologically through another predetermined box
to tick or question to ask being programmed into the
computer program’s interface. However, deskilling
the humans and substituting the ‘‘unreliable’’ worker
with socially or technologically standardized rules
takes us back to a rule-based ethic and its conflation
with control. Controlling managerial and techno-
logical pressures drain employees of phronesis, since
there is no opportunity to use it, and phronesis, like
all practical skills, needs practice. This questions the
usefulness and morality of prescriptive ethical codes
or principles on guiding practical behaviour. This
issue has been discussed (Stevens, 1994; Weaver,
1995) and contested (Kjonstad and Willmott, 1995)
elsewhere, with the latter more critical perspective
arguing that ethical codes or rules are being confused
with power mechanisms and organizational control,
rather than ethical judgements. Ethical prescriptive
rules or codes can therefore be seen as ‘‘managerial
tools for shaping change’’ (Stevens, 1994: 64), where
‘‘employees then have the option of complying, at
least behaviourally, with the code’s instructions or
risking their livelihood’’ (Kjonstad and Willmott,
1995: 449). The foundations of the rules are in the
power of decision-makers, whose knowledge of the
everyday work activities are often limited and whose
agendas are not necessarily for the human good.
Conclusions and implications
The examples above are useful for understanding
how ethics can be studied and conceptualized
empirically in everyday activities. From these brief
examples, it is now possible to sketch out some
advantages of considering phronesis in business
ethics and the implications of the development of
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practical wisdom, which are summarized in Table I
below. The examples and discussion above illustrate
how phronesis locates ethics in a particular situation,
where the actual choices need to be made. In this
rich context, ethics becomes much more ambiguous
and codes are of limited use (Munro, 1997). Situated
and practical ethics imply immunity to theoretical
universalization. This does not mean that we cannot
make judgements and that ‘‘anything goes’’ in a
relativist sense. On the contrary, these judgements
should be considered in the material and social
context of limited choices and possibilities for action.
We need to realize the emptiness of ethical rules
without situated actions; it is in the doing that
actions acquire their ethical significance (Holt, 2006;
Maguire, 1997). Hence, the identification and
evaluation of unethical behaviour should be based
on what is done in a specific situation within a
particular context, with the aim of ethics being to
develop the capacity to handle these situations. In
everyday actions, ethics is practical and the devel-
opment of phronesis can guide one through the
particularities. Phronesis is not the ‘‘right’’ way of
doing things in a particular community, but the
‘‘good’’ action under the circumstances. Taking the
situation into account means that one needs to give
employees the best opportunity to act ethically in the
community. The examples above illustrate the
importance of easing the material and social pressures
of the situations. If one wants the organizational
members to act ethically, they need to be able to
take ethical decisions and to be given scope to reflect
upon the decisions.
Phronesis is developed through experience of
understanding alternative actions and this experience
is gained by sharing situations, cases and stories. It is
through experience, collaboration and discussion
that members of organizations develop the capacity
to take morally appropriate practical decisions.
Successful ethical learning occurs in the contingent
practical situations that emerge in the workplace.
That is why it is in the situations that ethical
socialization and training must occur, to make sure
that a more ethical community emerges from past
practices. Giving people time to reflect upon and
discuss their activities does not necessarily change
them but it does make change more likely. The
alternative is to enforce disciplinary and controlling
pressures to make people behave in certain ways.
However, rules or principles will not get us there,
since we cannot expect people to act ethically if
there they are given no opportunity to exercise
practical ethical judgement. This is the major point:
following ethical codes does not involve choice,
merely compliance; if one does not choose to act,
one has not acted ethically. Too many codes and
regulations, and too much control lead to the
opposite, since there will always be situations that
the ethics codes cannot cover; where the upgraded
computer programs cannot give you the answer; and
customer situations that the call-coaching form does
not deal with. There are rarely any clear-cut cases
when the complexity of organizational life is taken
into account. Complex and extensive rules require
an even more virtuous user, since rules are only
useful if one is allowed to question them.
TABLE I
Comparison between conventional and phronesis-based ethics
Conventional Business Ethics (deontological, consequential) Phronesis
Aim Search for universal rules to handle all situations. Development of practical wisdom
to handle particular situations.
Underlying thesis Right versus wrong reasoning. Better versus worse actions.
Method Development of rules. Development of human beings.
Moral training Theoretical understanding of the ethical
theories and their inherited rules.
Practical understanding of different
alternatives to consider.
Pedagogy Memorising rules. Sharing cases and stories.
Usage Suitable for theoretical dilemmas. Suitable for practical dilemmas.
Advocates Promotion of compliance with rules. Promotion of questioning of rules.
Consequence Restricts moral capacity. Empowers moral capacity.
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Learning does not necessarily take place through
increased analytical interpretation of others’ behav-
iour. We may just do what others do, act without
reflecting on what we are doing, and find it difficult
to articulate the practical rules that we are following
(Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001). It is therefore
important to raise the situational awareness and
understanding of what individuals are doing.
Drawing upon the case study, one example would
be to raise the awareness of the ‘‘informal’’ rule of
asking whether there are children or animals in the
car, discuss the implications and morality of the rule,
and make sure that new members in the community
are aware of the ‘‘good’’ actions above and beyond
the ‘‘right’’ ones. However, the mere rule itself
would mean very little if it were not for the rich
stories surrounding the question and its contextu-
alized consequences. To further develop their
practical wisdom, the consultants in the case needed
to question the wider tradition of customer service
and connect their practices to the surrounding
society. Phronesis is about directing our actions to-
wards the good of the whole community (Aristotle,
1999). Tsoukas and Vladimirou suggested this in
arguing that ‘‘practical mastery needs to be supple-
mented by a quasi theoretical understanding of what
individuals are doing when they exercise that mas-
tery’’ (2001: 989-990).
Rather than merely promoting ethical codes, we
should, like the manager in the Business Relations
call centre, recommend that staff question and
discuss ethical codes in their everyday activities to
develop their phronesis. Disagreement about how
to act in the organization should therefore be
welcomed, in order to allow the situation to be
viewed from different perspectives and to work
out alternative actions. Post-modern ethics has
taught us that ‘‘there are no right views, just a
number of perspectives’’ (Duska, 1993: 235) and
pragmatists have taught us that the best alternative
in that specific situation should be applied (Rorty,
1999, 2006). Phronesis is about questioning the
‘‘right’’ way of doing things to make sure the
‘‘good’’ way of doing things is performed.
Developing phronesis encourages moral activities
and practices. To improve morality, ethical
reflection must therefore be concerned with the
situated performance, rather than universal princi-
ples or texts in the form of guidelines or codes of
conduct. Phronesis is acquired through critically
questioning the written and unwritten rules, prin-
ciples and codes. Universal ethical codes and rules
of ‘‘right’’ and ‘‘wrong’’ are useful as a basis for
discussion and reflection, but phronimos needs to
know when and why to follow or break rules in
practice. By being confronted with complex situ-
ations where there are no right answers, the
employees learn to make ‘‘good judgements in
difficult situations’’ (Maguire, 1997: 1412). Phro-
nesis is about constantly improving oneself to
handle different and uncertain situations in life
better (Holt, 2006), where there are often multiple
and conflicting choices to be made (Clegg et al.,
2006). Developing phronesis can empower
employees to make choices, take decisions in
morally ambiguous situations, and take responsi-
bility for their choices.
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